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Justine Salam / Hany Besada
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SBE, Vol.20, No.1, 2017
ISSN 1818-1228
©Copyright 2017/College of Business and Economics,
Qatar University
Africa’s development trajectory.”
53
China tries
not to act like a ‘grab-it-all’ power, but rather
like a trade partner exclusively interested in
conducting business. Furthermore, as Taylor
underlines, “China’s renewed interest in
Africa coincided with an upsurge of western
interest in promoting liberal democracy and
human rights,”
54
a measure perceived as
neo-imperialism by developing countries,
especially authoritarian regimes. China took
advantage of this context and re-assured many
of its African trade partners that its sole interest
is in business transactions. Beijing has also
avoided framing its approach from a human
rights standpoint and preferred emphasizing
“economic rights” and “rights of subsistence”
of developing countries.
55
Consequently,
many African powers view China’s presence
as a chance to disengage from the West and its
constant political demands, leaving China to
balance its need for resources with “diplomacy
to court African leaders.”
56
The advantage of not being associated with
colonialism and imperialism could have been
a double-edged sword and disadvantaged
China because it does not possess the historical
linkages with strategic oil-exporting countries
like European powers. However, China made
the best of it by approaching itsAfrican partners
as an independent business relationship. In the
same vein, China has had access to countries
where American and European companies
are absent due to political instability and
human rights violations. Some North African
countries like Libya and Sudan have been
isolated by American foreign policy; yet, as
53 Naidu and Davies ,Who was the real winner in China?
China Monitor 13, Centre for Chinese Studies, University
of Stellenboschs, 2006, pp. 70.
54 Taylor (2006), pp. 939.
55 Ibid, p. 939.
56 Naidu and Davies, China fuels its future with African
riches, South African Journal of International Affairs
13(2). 2006, Pp 80.
with the Iranian case, China has tremendously
benefited from this vacuum to seize important
deals and gain assets
57
. Unlike the Middle East,
oil upstream markets are wide open for foreign
investments in North Africa. As exploration is
more risky, China has seized opportunities to
invest in upstream markets, often becoming
the most important investor
58
. Indeed, North
Africa is particularly in need of investment.
Unlike its Middle Eastern counterpart where
the oil sector is saturated, Africa has mostly
been enthusiastic, and welcomed Chinese
foreign direct investment to invigorate its
neglected sectors, especially oil.
Given the uniqueness of the Middle East in
relation to oil sustainability, geographical
proximity, and strategic location, it is difficult
for China to move away from the Middle East.
The Beijing Consensus is especially appealing
to developing states because it does not involve
immediate political change. Unlike the Cold
War era, current Chinese foreign policy is
more concerned with economic development
than ideology.
59
Both China and the Middle
East have a clear preference for “a faster pace
of economic reform compared to political
change,”
60
which creates space for increasing
cooperation.
In addition to oil, both economies complement
each other because Persian Gulf states are huge
markets with medium populations, striving
for articles of production and daily use, which
China produces cheaply and efficiently. The
oil states are major consumers of Chinese
57 Salman, M., Moritz, P., and Gustaaf Geeraerts. “Hedging
in the Middle East and China-U.S. Competition.”
Asian
Politics & Policy
7, 4: 575–596. (2015)
58 Zhao (2007)
59 Hontu (2010)
60 Sager, Abdulaziz. 2010. ‘GCC-China Relations:
Looking beyond Oil-risks and Rewards’, in Abdulaziz,
Sager, Geoffrey, Kemp (eds), China’s Growing Role in the
Middle East. Washington, DC: Nixon Center, 2010, Pp.21.