

42
THE NEW SILK ROAD: CHINA’ ENERGY POLICYAND STRATEGY IN THE MENA REGION
SBE, Vol.20, No.1, 2017
ISSN 1818-1228
©Copyright 2017/College of Business and Economics,
Qatar University
Consensus. The Beijing Consensus is a term
coined in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo,
Professor at Tsinghua University, Beijing,
China and former Foreign Editor for
Time
magazine. In his famous piece titled
The
Beijing Consensus
, Ramo offers an analysis of
the Beijing Consensus, which he argues, can
be an appealing alternative to the Washington
Consensus. The Beijing Consensus is founded
on three “axioms”
35
. First, China focuses on
constant innovation while the Washington
Consensus abhors drastic change. Second,
sustainability, equality, and quality-of-life are
as valid indicators of successful economies as
per-capita GDP. Lastly, unlike the Washington
Consensus, which is thirsty for power
and advocates a hegemonic world system
dominated by the United States, the Beijing
Consensus places full self-determination as
the greatest priority and value. In practice,
self-determination has been translated by
increasing multilateralism
inter alia
. In the
case of China’s oil policy, China created new
bounds with Middle Eastern oil-rich states
such as Saudi Arabia and Iran but also reached
out to other partners such as North Africa, Sub-
SaharanAfrica, and SouthAmerica to diversify
its oil supply. In Ramo’s words, “China’s new
development approach is driven by a desire
to have equitable, peaceful high-quality
growth”
36
.
Unlike the Washington Consensus, the Beijing
Consensus has sought to prioritize economics
over political and cultural differences
especially in energy policy. In other words,
China has focused on finding good trading
partners regardless of their political and
cultural diversity. From China’s point of view,
China’s approach to MENA is mercantilist,
thus, motivated by, and targeted solely for,
35 Ramo, J.
The Beijing Consensus
. London: The Foreign
Policy Centre. (2004), Pp.8.
36 Ibid., Pp. 6.
markets, profits, and securing oil provisions
37.
On the other hand, the Washington Consensus
is famous for using economic relations to
influence its partners’ political and cultural
practices. The Beijing Consensus is rooted in
realism and
realpolitik
, while the Washington
Consensus is driven by neo-liberal principles.
One can easily see that some of Washington’s
trading partners who struggled to adapt to
Washington’s standards appreciate the Beijing
Consensus. This has regularly frustrated the
United States who feared that the appeal
of the Beijing Consensus would diminish
Washington’s chances of exerting political
influence by preventing it from spreading its
neo-liberal model in exchange for strategic
partnerships with developing countries—
particularly the Middle East.
In
The Beijing Consensus
, Stefan Halper
states that China definitely threatens American
interests—economic interests in particular. He
recognizes that the Chinese model strongly
appeals to developing countries, the latter
preferring “market authoritarianism and its high
growth” rather than “market democracy and
its freedoms”
38
. Recent military interventions
in the Middle East, such as the United States
initiating war in Afghanistan and Iraq in
2001 and 2003 respectively, have left painful
memories of foreign mediators in the region.
China’s lack of demand for political reform in
exchange for aid or investment was received as
a welcome new opportunity for oil-rich Middle
Eastern countries who saw an opportunity
to govern and conduct politics in their own
manner without external questioning. A similar
37 Feng, Z. “Oil Nexus vs. Diplomatic Crux: China’s
Energy Demands, Maritime Security and the Middle East
Aspirations.” In
China’s Growing Role in the Middle East:
Implications for the Region and Beyond
. Eds. A. Sager and
G. Kemp. Washington, DC: The Nixon Center. Pp. 31-42.
(2010)
38 Halper Stefan. The Beijing Consensus: How China’s
Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First
Century, 2010 , pp. iii.