

Justine Salam / Hany Besada
43
SBE, Vol.20, No.1, 2017
ISSN 1818-1228
©Copyright 2017/College of Business and Economics,
Qatar University
argument can be applied to North Africa,
especially in the case of Sudan. Still, concerns
have been raised with regards to the Chinese
approach, some arguing that democratic values
are looked down upon, if not endangered by
progressive preference for China’s model of
economic development and that “Beijing’s
example illuminates a path around the West”
39
.
Furthermore, the Beijing Consensus is not
only unique, but it is also highly controlled
by the state. In fact, although neo-liberal
economic policies allow the private sector
to flourish, the state is keeping a firm grip
on their development, along with a grip on
courts, the military, and information flow.
According to Halper
40
, China is operating
“state-guided capitalism” by ensuring that
powerful companies are instruments of the
Party’s foreign policy. Some fear that market
authoritarianism, including its economic
liberalization coupled with authoritarianist
politics, may be appealing to developing states,
thus endangering the Washington’s Consensus’
agenda
41
. Exploring the different national
effects of the Consensuses is beyond the scope
of this paper but it is important to keep the key
characteristics of each consensus in mind, as
well as the fact that many MENA states are
authoritarian in nature.
-
In relation to MENA, there are two key
dimensions to China’s economic strategy.
First, China seeks to expand friendly,
multidimensional relations with Middle
Eastern states and to remain politically
neutral especially with regards to conflicts.
China adheres to its foreign policy of
non-interference in other countries’
internal affairs, but at the same time we
can observe that China is getting more
actively involved in the conflicts in the
39 Ibid. Pp. v
40 Ibid.,Pp 102
41 Ibid., Pp.139
region, adopting a certain stance at the
UN Security Council and making efforts
for intermediation, for instance between
Israel and Palestine. China has proactive
stance towards political issues in the
Middle East, which surely affects its oil
business
42
.
Second, China wishes to access Middle Eastern
resources by exploiting markets, capital, and
petroleum to fuel its own economic drive
43
.
However, the Chinese elite knows that in
the last decades, the Middle East has been
considered as the United States’ economic
fief
44
, and therefore, by trading with the Middle
East, China exposes itself to closer surveillance
by Washington. Further, China perceives
American concerns about the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and
democratization as pretexts for interventions
on the ground, accusing the United States
from engaging in a “new kind of imperialism”
through the control of natural resources.
45
Yet,
China is driven by its wish to become the
“friend of all and the enemy of none”
46
by
trying not to directly confront Washington. In
the same vain the Silk Road Economic Belt is
grand initiative of China in the entire Eurasian
region. China’s Silk Road Economic Belt and
21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative
aims to connect Asia, Africa, Europe, and their
near seas. The Silk Road promotes China and
Middle Eastern States’ Common Interests.
42 Daojiong Zha and Meidan Michal, China and the
Middle East in a New Energy Landscape, The Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 2015. Pg 25
43 Alterman & Garver, The Vital Triangle, China, The
United States and the Middle East, CSIS,Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC. 2008,
Pg 82
44 Shen, D. (2006). “Iran’s NuclearAmbitions Test China’s
Wisdom.”
The Washington Quarterly
29, 2: 55–66. (2006);
Salman, Pieper, and Geeraerts, 2015; Li, 2015
45 Cited in Alterman, J. and Garver, J.
The Vital Triangle:
China, the U.S., and the Middle East.
Washington, D.C.:
CSIS Press. (2008), pp.12
46 Ibid, pp.4.