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Justine Salam / Hany Besada

43

SBE, Vol.20, No.1, 2017

ISSN 1818-1228

©Copyright 2017/College of Business and Economics,

Qatar University

argument can be applied to North Africa,

especially in the case of Sudan. Still, concerns

have been raised with regards to the Chinese

approach, some arguing that democratic values

are looked down upon, if not endangered by

progressive preference for China’s model of

economic development and that “Beijing’s

example illuminates a path around the West”

39

.

Furthermore, the Beijing Consensus is not

only unique, but it is also highly controlled

by the state. In fact, although neo-liberal

economic policies allow the private sector

to flourish, the state is keeping a firm grip

on their development, along with a grip on

courts, the military, and information flow.

According to Halper

40

, China is operating

“state-guided capitalism” by ensuring that

powerful companies are instruments of the

Party’s foreign policy. Some fear that market

authoritarianism, including its economic

liberalization coupled with authoritarianist

politics, may be appealing to developing states,

thus endangering the Washington’s Consensus’

agenda

41

. Exploring the different national

effects of the Consensuses is beyond the scope

of this paper but it is important to keep the key

characteristics of each consensus in mind, as

well as the fact that many MENA states are

authoritarian in nature.

-

In relation to MENA, there are two key

dimensions to China’s economic strategy.

First, China seeks to expand friendly,

multidimensional relations with Middle

Eastern states and to remain politically

neutral especially with regards to conflicts.

China adheres to its foreign policy of

non-interference in other countries’

internal affairs, but at the same time we

can observe that China is getting more

actively involved in the conflicts in the

39 Ibid. Pp. v

40 Ibid.,Pp 102

41 Ibid., Pp.139

region, adopting a certain stance at the

UN Security Council and making efforts

for intermediation, for instance between

Israel and Palestine. China has proactive

stance towards political issues in the

Middle East, which surely affects its oil

business

42

.

Second, China wishes to access Middle Eastern

resources by exploiting markets, capital, and

petroleum to fuel its own economic drive

43

.

However, the Chinese elite knows that in

the last decades, the Middle East has been

considered as the United States’ economic

fief

44

, and therefore, by trading with the Middle

East, China exposes itself to closer surveillance

by Washington. Further, China perceives

American concerns about the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and

democratization as pretexts for interventions

on the ground, accusing the United States

from engaging in a “new kind of imperialism”

through the control of natural resources.

45

Yet,

China is driven by its wish to become the

“friend of all and the enemy of none”

46

by

trying not to directly confront Washington. In

the same vain the Silk Road Economic Belt is

grand initiative of China in the entire Eurasian

region. China’s Silk Road Economic Belt and

21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative

aims to connect Asia, Africa, Europe, and their

near seas. The Silk Road promotes China and

Middle Eastern States’ Common Interests.

42 Daojiong Zha and Meidan Michal, China and the

Middle East in a New Energy Landscape, The Royal

Institute of International Affairs, 2015. Pg 25

43 Alterman & Garver, The Vital Triangle, China, The

United States and the Middle East, CSIS,Centre for

Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC. 2008,

Pg 82

44 Shen, D. (2006). “Iran’s NuclearAmbitions Test China’s

Wisdom.”

The Washington Quarterly

29, 2: 55–66. (2006);

Salman, Pieper, and Geeraerts, 2015; Li, 2015

45 Cited in Alterman, J. and Garver, J.

The Vital Triangle:

China, the U.S., and the Middle East.

Washington, D.C.:

CSIS Press. (2008), pp.12

46 Ibid, pp.4.