

Justine Salam / Hany Besada
49
SBE, Vol.20, No.1, 2017
ISSN 1818-1228
©Copyright 2017/College of Business and Economics,
Qatar University
on 43 projects worth $8 billion
77
. In January
2001, Sinopec and the National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC) signed an agreement to
exploit Zavareh-Kashan oil field, and Sinopec
took charge of the operation. Simultaneously,
the two companies also signed an agreement
worth $150 million to upgrade two NIOC
refineries
78
. On December 9, 2007, Sinopec
signed an agreement with the Iranian Ministry
of Oil to develop the Yadavaran oil field in
southwestern Iran, which turned out to be one
of the most significant deals that China signed
with Iran so far.
China also applied its equity ownership strategy
in Iran through Sinopec who holds a 51% equity
share of the Yadavaran field. As a side note,
the field is supposedly the largest untapped oil
field in the world, with an estimated oil reserve
of over 300,000 million barrel of crude oil. By
2009, Iran provided 11% of China’s oil import,
ranking third after Saudi Arabia and Angola.
According to Chubin
79
, Chinese oil companies
have signed long-term contracts with Iran worth
$200 billion. More than a hundred Chinese
companies are currently operating in Iran’s
oil and gas facilities. The essence of Sino-
Iranian relations comes from the abundance
of Iranian oil and gas reserves, associated
with Western withdrawal from Iranian markets
and economic sanctions. China simply moved
into the economic vacuum created by U.S.
policy,
80
which helped Iran obtain a reputation
of “reliable supplier,”
81
weakening the impacts
of sanctions, and allowing Iran to create new
bonds with China.
77 (Hongtu, 2010. Pp 21
78 Olimat Muhammad S., China and the Middle East:
From Silk Road to Arab Spring,
Reprint Edition, NewYork,
Rougtledge, 2015. Pp. 56
79 Chubin .2010 pp. 31
80 Alterman.2008. Pp. 21
81 Chubbin (2010), pp. 65-66.
Iran’s Nuclear Program and International
Sanctions
The Sino-Iranian relationship has worried
many actors in the region. Giving the lack of
trust between the Kingdom and Iran, Saudi
Arabia is concerned about the current state
of affairs between China and Iran. Thanks to
China’s growing investment in hydrocarbons,
it is evident that Chinese companies have
successfully obtained several oil contracts
in Iran, strengthening the ties between two
countries. However, Beijing has been cautious
in its approach towards Tehran: China’s foreign
policy is driven by commerce and China has
carefully separated its oil interests from rising
nuclear concerns in Iran
82
. As suspicions rose
regarding Iran’s potential nuclear programs,
China’s support for Iran became a significant
source of conflict in U.S.-Sino relations in the
1990s. Later on, as confrontation with Iran
intensified in 2004, Washington pressured
Beijing to cease its cooperation with Iran on
the Yadavaran oil field. In 2005, when the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
determined that over a period of eighteen
years, Iran had conducted nuclear activities
without reporting them, China attempted to
delay and soften U.S. measures against Iran.
In particular, China opposed U.S. efforts to
send the matter to the United Nations Security
Council and insisted that the IAEA was the
adequate venue for dealing with the issue. In
2006, China repeatedly urged Iran to respond
“positively” and “flexibly”
83
to the proposals
made by the European Union or Russia.
However, when Iran declared that it would
continue uranium enrichment and ignored the
deadline specified in Resolution 1696, China
finally agreed to join the other permanent
82 Feng
.2010.Pp23
83 Alterman & Garver, The Vital Triangle, China, The
United States and the Middle East, CSIS,Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC. 2008,
Pp 43.