

50
THE NEW SILK ROAD: CHINA’ ENERGY POLICYAND STRATEGY IN THE MENA REGION
SBE, Vol.20, No.1, 2017
ISSN 1818-1228
©Copyright 2017/College of Business and Economics,
Qatar University
members of the United Nations Security
Council and Germany (P5+1) in implementing
gradual sanctions against Iran. Thus, while
China delayed the imposition of sanctions, it
was also fundamentally opposed to Tehran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons due to its
potential negative impacts for China’s
economic well-being. In fact, some Chinese
analysts argue that allowing Iran to obtain
nuclear weapons would make several other
states of the Middle East more likely to obtain
their own arsenals. This would then weaken
China’s status as a major nuclear power.
Proliferation of nuclear weapons could also
lead to political instability in the region, which
would be disruptive for Chinese business
84
.
Consequently, the Iranian nuclear issue
provides a good example of Beijing’s attempts
to balance its policy of cooperation with the
U.S. and with the Middle East, especially with
oil-rich states such as Iran.
For a long time, China had been concerned
about the tension between Iran and the West
and had opposed a military strike against Iran
85
.
These fears were mollified in 2015 when Iran
and the P5+1 reached a landmark deal over
the nuclear program of Iran. Accordingly,
Iran agreed to reduce its nuclear capabilities
and provide greater access to the International
Atomic Energy Agency in exchange for the
removal of the sanctions
86
. This agreement is
likely to have substantial implications for the
relations between China and Iran.
From the Iranian perspective, it is obvious
that during the long period of sanctions, China
replaced the West as a source of investment
and support. In fact Sino-Iranian relations
84 Ibid.
85 Feng 2010..Pp 47
86 BBC News. “Iran’s Nuclear Deal: Key Details.”
January 16, 2016. URL:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655
had worried the United States as it made total
isolation of Iran unattainable. These relations
allowed Iran to survive from the economic
sanctions imposed on its nuclear program and
kept Iran “independent.”
87
Furthermore, Iran
certainly had political goals in maintaining
strong ties with China. According to Chubin,
Iran wished “to use China as a balancer against
the U.S., to use it as a source of technology in
defence and energy fields, and to create a deep
and reliable commercial relationship which
can translate into a more substantial strategic
relationship.”
88
Thus, Iran’s focus had been
on short-term relations while China focused
on long-term. Whereas Iran may wish to use
its natural resources as a political instrument,
China’s foreign policy is primarily focused on
economic relations.
Overall, the end of the sanctions creates several
opportunities and challenges for Chinese
influence in Iran. Firstly, it is clear that Iran
would start enjoying the sudden increase in
investments and commerce with the United
States and the EU. However, with Donald
Trump as president of theUnitedStates in office,
circumstances may be different as he pursues
his presidential promise to put “America
First” policies that are critical of world
liberal order. Donald Trump’s conservative
nationalist approach to foreign policy, no
matter how skillfully presented, has been noted
to be flawed. The U.S. cannot be strengthened
through a process of even partial withdrawal
from the vicissitudes of international politics
and trade
89
. Meanwhile China would benefit
from the increase in the production of oil and gas
in Iran. On the other hand, Chinese companies
would now have to compete with their Western
counterparts. Particularly, various Eastern
87 Chubbin .2010. pp. 64-65.
88 Ibid, pp. 67.
89 Thompson Jack. American Affairs and U.S. Foreign
Policy,
Policy Perspectives
, Vol. 5/3, June, 2017. Pp 2