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50

THE NEW SILK ROAD: CHINA’ ENERGY POLICYAND STRATEGY IN THE MENA REGION

SBE, Vol.20, No.1, 2017

ISSN 1818-1228

©Copyright 2017/College of Business and Economics,

Qatar University

members of the United Nations Security

Council and Germany (P5+1) in implementing

gradual sanctions against Iran. Thus, while

China delayed the imposition of sanctions, it

was also fundamentally opposed to Tehran’s

acquisition of nuclear weapons due to its

potential negative impacts for China’s

economic well-being. In fact, some Chinese

analysts argue that allowing Iran to obtain

nuclear weapons would make several other

states of the Middle East more likely to obtain

their own arsenals. This would then weaken

China’s status as a major nuclear power.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons could also

lead to political instability in the region, which

would be disruptive for Chinese business

84

.

Consequently, the Iranian nuclear issue

provides a good example of Beijing’s attempts

to balance its policy of cooperation with the

U.S. and with the Middle East, especially with

oil-rich states such as Iran.

For a long time, China had been concerned

about the tension between Iran and the West

and had opposed a military strike against Iran

85

.

These fears were mollified in 2015 when Iran

and the P5+1 reached a landmark deal over

the nuclear program of Iran. Accordingly,

Iran agreed to reduce its nuclear capabilities

and provide greater access to the International

Atomic Energy Agency in exchange for the

removal of the sanctions

86

. This agreement is

likely to have substantial implications for the

relations between China and Iran.

From the Iranian perspective, it is obvious

that during the long period of sanctions, China

replaced the West as a source of investment

and support. In fact Sino-Iranian relations

84 Ibid.

85 Feng 2010..Pp 47

86 BBC News. “Iran’s Nuclear Deal: Key Details.”

January 16, 2016. URL:

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-

middle-east-33521655

had worried the United States as it made total

isolation of Iran unattainable. These relations

allowed Iran to survive from the economic

sanctions imposed on its nuclear program and

kept Iran “independent.”

87

Furthermore, Iran

certainly had political goals in maintaining

strong ties with China. According to Chubin,

Iran wished “to use China as a balancer against

the U.S., to use it as a source of technology in

defence and energy fields, and to create a deep

and reliable commercial relationship which

can translate into a more substantial strategic

relationship.”

88

Thus, Iran’s focus had been

on short-term relations while China focused

on long-term. Whereas Iran may wish to use

its natural resources as a political instrument,

China’s foreign policy is primarily focused on

economic relations.

Overall, the end of the sanctions creates several

opportunities and challenges for Chinese

influence in Iran. Firstly, it is clear that Iran

would start enjoying the sudden increase in

investments and commerce with the United

States and the EU. However, with Donald

Trump as president of theUnitedStates in office,

circumstances may be different as he pursues

his presidential promise to put “America

First” policies that are critical of world

liberal order. Donald Trump’s conservative

nationalist approach to foreign policy, no

matter how skillfully presented, has been noted

to be flawed. The U.S. cannot be strengthened

through a process of even partial withdrawal

from the vicissitudes of international politics

and trade

89

. Meanwhile China would benefit

from the increase in the production of oil and gas

in Iran. On the other hand, Chinese companies

would now have to compete with their Western

counterparts. Particularly, various Eastern

87 Chubbin .2010. pp. 64-65.

88 Ibid, pp. 67.

89 Thompson Jack. American Affairs and U.S. Foreign

Policy,

Policy Perspectives

, Vol. 5/3, June, 2017. Pp 2